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Abstract. Recent methods in multiple landmark detection based on
deep convolutional neural networks (CNNs) reach high accuracy and im-
prove traditional clinical workflow. However, the vulnerability of CNNs
to adversarial-example attacks can be easily exploited to break classifica-
tion and segmentation tasks. This paper is the first to study how fragile
a CNN-based model on multiple landmark detection to adversarial per-
turbations. Specifically, we propose a novel Adaptive Targeted Iterative
FGSM (ATI-FGSM) attack against the state-of-the-art models in mul-
tiple landmark detection. The attacker can use ATI-FGSM to precisely
control the model predictions of arbitrarily selected landmarks, while
keeping other stationary landmarks still, by adding imperceptible per-
turbations to the original image. A comprehensive evaluation on a public
dataset for cephalometric landmark detection demonstrates that the ad-
versarial examples generated by ATI-FGSM break the CNN-based net-
work more effectively and efficiently, compared with the original Iterative
FGSM attack. Our work reveals serious threats to patients’ health. Fur-
thermore, we discuss the limitations of our method and provide potential
defense directions, by investigating the coupling effect of nearby land-
marks, i.e., a major source of divergence in our experiments. Our source
code is available at https://github.com/qsyao/attack landmark detection.
Keywords: Landmark Detection · Adversarial Examples.
1 Introduction
Multiple landmark detection is an important pre-processing step in therapy plan-
ning and intervention, thus it has attracted great interest from academia and
industry [26,27,13,22]. It has been successfully applied to many practical medical
clinical scenarios such as knee joint surgery [23], orthognathic and maxillofacial
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surgeries [3], carotid artery bifurcation [24], pelvic trauma surgery [2], bone
age estimation [5]. Also, it is an important step in medical imaging analysis
[16,12,10], e.g., registration or initialization of segmentation algorithms.
Recently, CNN-based methods has rapidly become a methodology of choice
for analyzing medical images. Compared with expert manual annotation, CNN
achieves high accuracy and efficiency at a low-cost [3], showing great potential
in multiple landmark detection. Chen et al. [3] use cascade U-Net to launch a
two-stage heatmap regression [16], which is widely used in medical landmark
detection. Zhong et al. [25] accomplish the task by regressing the heatmap and
coordinate offset maps at the same time.
However, the vulnerability of CNNs to adversarial attacks can not be over-
looked [19]. The attacks are legitimate examples with human-imperceptible per-
turbations, which attempt to fool a trained model to make incorrect predictions
[7]. Goodfellow et al. [6] develop a fast gradient sign method (FGSM) to gen-
erate perturbations by back-propagating the adversarial gradient induced by an
intended incorrect prediction. Kurakin et al. [9] extend it to Targeted Iterative
FGSM by generating the perturbations iteratively to hack the network to pre-
dict the attacker desired target class. Adversarial attacks against CNN models
become a real threat not only in classification tasks but also in segmentation and
localization [21]. The dense adversary generation (DAG) algorithm proposed in
[21] by Xie et al. aims to force the CNN based network to predict all pixels
to target classes without L∞ norm limitation. Other works that apply the ad-
versarial attack to classification and segmentation [14,7,15] hack the network in
both targeted and non-targeted manners with a high success rate.
A targeted attack on landmark detection is stealthy and disastrous as the
detection precision is tightly related to a patient’s health during surgical in-
tervention, clinical diagnosis or measurement, etc. To study the vulnerability of
landmark detection systems, we propose an approach for targeted attack against
CNN-based models in this paper. Our main contributions are:
1. A simple yet representative multi-task U-Net to detect multiple landmarks
with high precision and high speed.
2. The first targeted adversarial attack against multiple landmark detection, to
the best of our knowledge, which exposes the great vulnerability of medical
images against adversarial attack.
3. An Adaptive Targeted Iterative FGSM (ATI-FGSM) algorithm that makes
the attack more effective and efficient than the standard I-FGSM.
4. A comprehensive evaluation of the proposed algorithm to attack the land-
mark detection and understanding its limitations.
2 Multi-task U-Net for multiple landmark detection
Existing approaches for multiple landmark detection use a heatmap [16,25]
and/or coordinate offset maps [3] to represent a landmark and then a U-Net-like
network [17] is learned to predict the above map(s), which are post-processed
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Fig. 1. An example of targeted adversarial attack against multiple landmark detection
in a cephalometric radiograph. By adding imperceptible perturbations to the original
image (left most), we arbitrarily position 19 landmarks to form the letters ‘MICCAI’.
The perturbation is magnified by a factor of 8 for visualization.
to derive the final landmark location. Here we implement a multi-task U-Net to
predict both heatmap and offset maps simultaneously and treat this network as
our target model to attack.
For the ith landmark located at (xi, yi) in an image X, its heatmap Y
h
i is
computed as a Gaussian function Y hi (x, y) = exp[− 12σ2 ((x−xi)2+(y−yi)2)] and
its x-offset map Y oxi predicts the relative offset vector Y
ox
i = (x − xi)/σ from
x to the corresponding landmark xi. Similarly, its y-offset map Y
oy
i is defined.
Different from [25], we truncate the map functions to zero for the pixels whose
Y hi (x, y) ≥ 0.6. We use a binary cross-entropy loss Lh to punish the divergence of
predicted and ground-truth heatmaps, and an L1 loss L
o to punish the difference
in coordinate offset maps. Here is the loss function Li for the i
th landmark:
Li(Yi, gi(X, θ)) = αL
h
i (Y
h
i , g
h
i (X, θ)) + sign(Y
h
i )
∑
o∈{ox,oy}
Loi (Y
o
i , g
o
i (X, θ)) (1)
where ghi (X, θ) and g
o
i (X, θ) are the networks that predict heatmaps and coor-
dinate offset maps, respectively; θ is the network parameters; α is a balancing
coefficient, and sign(·) is a sign function which is used to ensure that only the
area highlighted by heatmap is included for calculation.
To deal with the limited data problem, we fine-tune the encoder of U-Net
initialized by the VGG19 network [18] pretrained on ImageNet [4]. In the test
phase, a majority-vote for candidate landmarks is conducted among all pixels
with heatmap value ghi (X, θ) ≥ 0.6, according to their coordinate offset maps
in goi (X, θ). The winning position in the i
th channel is the final predicted ith
landmark [3]. The whole framework is illustrated in Fig. 2.
3 Adversarial attack on multiple landmark detection
A general formulation. Given an original image X0, the attacker attempts
to generate a small perturbation P , such that (i) P is not perceptible to human
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Fig. 2. Overview of our Multi-Task U-Net. For coordinate offset maps, we only focus
on the areas with heatmap value ≥ 0.6. We set the value of the other areas to 0.
beings and (ii) for the perturbed image, i.e., X = X0 + P , its model prediction
g(X) is entirely controlled by the adversary. Follow the convention, we model
the non-perceptive property of the perturbation as a constraint that the L∞
norm of P = X − X0 is less than . In the context of targeted adversarial
attack on multiple landmark detection, taking full control of the model prediction
means that, for an image with K landmarks, the attacker is able to move N
arbitrary target landmarks to desired locations while leaving the remaining (K−
N) landmarks stationary.
We denote that the index set of all landmarks is given by Ω = {1, 2, . . . ,K}
and is split into two complementary subsets: T = {t1, t2, . . . , tN} for the indices
of target landmarks and S = {s1, s2, . . . , sK−N} for the indices of stationary
landmarks. We model the adversarial attack against the model prediction as
minimizing the Euclidean distance between any target landmark gt(X, θ) w.r.t.
its corresponding adversarial target location (xt, yt), while keeping any station-
ary landmark gs(X, θ) close to its original location (xs, ys):
min
X
∑
t∈T
||gt(X, θ)− (xt, yt)||2 +
∑
s∈S
||gs(X, θ)− (xs, ys)||2
s.t. ||P ||∞ = ||X −X0||∞ ≤ ,X ∈ [0, 256]C×H×M
(2)
To accommodate the map-based landmark representation, the attacker sets an
adversarial heatmap Y ht and coordinate offset maps Y
o
t based on the desired
position. We then replace the corresponding Y hi and Y
o
i with Y
h
t and Y
o
t in Eq.
(1). For a stationary landmark, we use heatmap gh(X, θ) and coordinate offset
maps go(X, θ) predicted by the original network as ground truth Ys.
min
X
L(Y, g(X, θ)) =
∑
t∈T
Lt(Yt, gt(X, θ)) +
∑
s∈S
Ls(Ys, gs(X, θ)). (3)
Targeted iterative FGSM [9]. Targeted iterative FGSM is an enhanced ver-
sion of Targeted FGSM [9], increasing the attack effectiveness by iteratively
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tuning an adversarial example. We adapt Targeted iterative FGSM from the
classification task to multiple landmark detection task by revising its loss func-
tion L in Eq. (3). As L decreases, the predicted heatmaps and coordinate offset
maps converge to the adversarial ones. This moves the targeted landmark to the
desired position while leaving the stationary landmarks at their original posi-
tions. The process of an adversarial example generation, i.e., decreasing L, is
given by:
Xadv0 = X0, X
adv
i+1 = clip[X
adv
i − η · sign(5Xadvi L(Y, g(X
adv
i , θ))), ] (4)
Adaptive targeted iterative FGSM (ATI-FGSM). There is a defect when
directly adapting iterative FGSM from classification to landmark detection. In
classification, each image is assigned a single label. However, for landmark de-
tection, an input image contains multiple landmarks at various locations. The
difficulty of moving each landmark varies significantly. Furthermore, the land-
marks are not independent, thus moving one landmark may affect another. For
example, moving a cohort of close landmarks (say around the jaw) to different
locations at the same time is hard. To deal with this problem, we follow our in-
tuition, that is, the relative vulnerability of each landmark to adversarial attack
can be dynamically estimated based on the corresponding loss. A large loss term
Lj at iteration i indicates that the landmark j is hard to converge to the de-
sired position at round i and vice versa. Thus, we adaptively assign a weight for
each landmark’s loss term in each iteration, e.g., a hard-to-converge landmark
is associated with a large loss, resulting in faster and better convergence during
network back-propagation. Formally, in each iteration, we have:
Lada(Y, g(X, θ)) =
∑
t∈T
αt · Lt(Yt, gt(X, θ)) +
∑
s∈S
αs · Ls(Ys, gs(X, θ))
αj = Lj/mean(L(Y, g(X, θ))) j ∈ [1,K]
(5)
where L(Y, g(X, θ)) is calculated by Eq. (3). The new Lada(Y, g(X, θ)), rather
than the original L(Y, g(X, θ)), is differentiated to generate gradient map in each
iteration of our proposed ATI-FGSM attack.
4 Experiments
Dataset and implementation details. We use a public dataset for cephalo-
metric landmark detection, provided in IEEE ISBI 2015 Challenge [20], which
contains 400 cephalometric radiographs. Each radiograph has 19 manually la-
beled landmarks of clinical anatomical significance by the two expert doctors. We
take the average annotations by two doctors as the ground truth landmarks. The
image size is 1935×2400, while the pixel spacing is 0.1mm. The radiographs are
split to 3 sets (Train, Test1, Test2) according to the official website, whose num-
bers of images are 150, 150, 100 respectively. We use mean radial error (MRE) to
measure the Euclidean distance between two landmarks and successful detection
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Table 1. Comparison of five state-of-the-art methods and our proposed multi-task
U-Net on the IEEE ISBI 2015 Challenge [20] datasets. We use the proposed multi-task
U-Net as the target model to hack.
Model
Test Dataset 1 Test Dataset 2
MRE 2mm 2.5mm 3mm 4mm MRE 2mm 2.5mm 3mm 4mm
Ibragimov et al. [8] 1.87 71.70 77.40 81.90 88.00 - 62.74 70.47 76.53 85.11
Lindner et al. [11] 1.67 74.95 80.28 84.56 89.68 - 66.11 72.00 77.63 87.42
Arik et al. [1] - 75.37 80.91 84.32 88.25 - 67.68 74.16 79.11 84.63
Zhong et al. [25] 1.14 86.74 92.00 94.71 97.82 - - - - -
Chen et al. [3] 1.17 86.67 92.67 95.54 98.53 1.48 75.05 82.84 88.53 95.05
Proposed 1.24 84.84 90.52 93.75 97.40 1.61 71.89 80.63 86.36 93.68
rate (SDR) in four radii (2mm, 2.5mm, 3mm, 4mm), which are designated by the
official challenge, to measure the performance for both adversarial attack and
multi-task U-Net. As MRE can be affected by extreme values, we report median
radial error (MedRE) for adversarial attacks additionally. Our multi-task U-Net
is trained on a Quadro RTX 8000 GPU and optimized by the Adam optimizer
with default settings. We set σ = 40. The learning rate is set to 1e-3 and decayed
by 0.1 every 100 epochs. After multiple trials, we select α = 1.0 for heatmaps
in Eq. (1). We resize the input image to 800× 640 and normalize the values to
[-1, 1]. Finally, we train our multi-task U-Net for 230 epochs with a batch size
of 8. In the adversarial attack phase, we set η=0.05 in Eq. (4) for the iterative
increment of perturbations in our experiments.
Detection performance of multi-task U-Net. We report the perfor-
mance of our multi-task U-Net and compare it with five state-of-the-art meth-
ods [8,11,1,25,3] in Table 1. Our proposed approach predicts the positions of the
landmarks only by regressing heatmaps and coordinate offset maps, which are
widely used in the landmark detection task [16,25,3]. In terms of performance,
our approach is close to the state-of-the-art methods [3,25] and significantly
ahead of the IEEE ISBI 2015 Challenge championship [11].
4.1 Performance of ATI-FSGM
We evaluate the performance of the ATI-FGSM attack against the multi-task
U-Net. To simulate the hardest scenario, our evaluation is established in a com-
pletely random setting. For each raw image in the two test datasets (250 images
in total), we repeat twice the following: First randomly select a number of land-
marks as targeted landmarks, leaving the rest as stationary landmarks. Then
the target coordinates are randomly generated for the selected landmarks, from
a huge rectangle (x ∈ [100, 600], y ∈ [250, 750]). So we have 500 attack attempts
in total. This high level of randomness introduces significantly difficult cases for
the adversarial attack. We generate adversarial examples by iterating 300 times
(unless otherwise specified), under the constraint that  = 8. As in Fig. 3, the
adversarial example moves the targeted landmarks (red) to the target positions
(green) by fooling the network to generate incorrect heatmaps and coordinate
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Fig. 3. An example of a targeted two-landmarks adversarial attack using our proposed
Adaptive Targeted Iterative FGSM (ATI-FGSM). Red points highlight the predicted
landmarks by the model on the original image, which are very close to the ground
truth landmarks. After adding imperceptible perturbation to the input image, the
model predicts the green points as the corresponding landmark positions. The green
points are far away from their original positions (red), and can be controlled by the
adversary. On the other hand, all other stationary points (blue) remain close to their
original positions.
Fig. 4. Comparison between TI-FGSM and our ATI-FGSM. Our ATI-FGSM can ar-
bitrarily move targeted landmarks away more efficiently and keep most of stationary
landmarks in their original positions.
offset maps. The small perturbation between the adversarial example and raw
radiograph is hard to percept by humans. As in Table 2, the goals of our adver-
sarial attack are quickly achieved in 300 iterations, and continuously optimized
for the remaining 700 iterations. Evidently, the widely used method like heatmap
regression [16] for landmark detection is very vulnerable to our attack.
Attack performance vs perturbation strength. We evaluate our method
under different constraints of perturbation intensity. Table 2 shows that the ad-
versarial examples generated by our method can achieve low MedRE and high
4mm SDR by attacking randomly targeted landmarks successfully, while keeping
most of the stationary landmarks at their original positions. Moreover, as the
L∞ norm constraint relaxes, MRE drops rapidly with more difficult landmarks
hacked, but a few stationary landmarks are moved away.
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Table 2. Attack performance at different iterations and L∞ constraints.
# of iterations ( = 8) 1 20 50 100 150 200 250 300 400 600 750 1000
Targeted MRE (mm) 71.6 51.7 33.0 22.2 18.0 15.5 14.1 12.3 11.5 10.7 9.9 9.1
Stationary MRE (mm) 1.49 4.43 6.23 5.21 5.49 5.07 5.00 5.31 5.63 5.43 5.38 5.06
Targeted MedRE (mm) 69.2 49.6 1.32 0.67 0.55 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.36 0.33
Stationary MedRE (mm) 1.08 1.21 1.17 1.09 1.09 1.08 1.08 1.08 1.08 1.09 1.09 1.09
Targeted 4mm SDR (%) 0.7 31.1 55.2 68.2 73.8 77.5 79.6 82.2 83.4 84.9 86.2 87.3
Stationary 4mm SDR (%) 95.9 94.4 92.9 93.5 93.3 93.3 93.9 92.8 93.2 93.3 94.1 93.8
-value (# of iterations=300) - - - 0.5 1 2 4 8 16 32 - -
Targeted MRE (mm) - - - 71.1 65.0 43.3 22.7 12.3 9.0 7.9 - -
Stationary MRE (mm) - - - 1.72 1.86 3.10 6.86 5.31 5.73 5.72 - -
Targeted MedRE (mm) - - - 72.2 65.1 34.1 0.5 0.42 0.42 0.42 - -
Stationary MedRE (mm) - - - 1.05 1.08 1.08 1.09 1.08 1.09 1.08 - -
Targeted 4mm SDR (%) - - - 1.17 9.69 38.3 68.5 82.2 87.3 88.2 - -
Stationary 4mm SDR (%) - - - 95.4 95.1 94.3 93.1 92.8 92.9 92.1 - -
Fig. 5. Relationship between attack performance (measured by MRE) of each of 19
landmarks and its degree of isolation.
The effect of adaptiveness in ATI-FGSM. We compare the evaluation
metrics and convergence speed of our method (green line) against Targeted I-
FGSM (blue line) by generating 500 random adversarial examples with  = 8.
The MRE and 4mm SDR (at 300 iterations) of our method are 12.28mm and
82% while Targeted I-FGSM convergences to 21.84mm and 72%, respectively.
Besides, our method compromises the network more quickly, results in a shorter
attack time. The results in Fig. 4 show the advantages of our method lie in not
only the attack effectiveness but also efficiency. Note that the attacker can not
keep all of the stationary landmarks still, a few stationary landmarks are moved
away by our method.
Attack performance vs degree of isolation. As some landmarks are
closely related, such as landmarks on the chin or nose, which are adjacent in all
images, we set up an experiment to investigate the relationship between MRE
and the degree of isolation. We define the degree of isolation of a landmark as
the average distance between its five nearest neighbors. As shown in Fig. 5, we
observe that MRE and degree of isolation are negatively correlated. Therefore,
moving a couple of adjacent landmarks to random positions is more difficult
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than moving isolated ones. This is the major source of target deviation in our
experiment, which may lead to potential defense.
A fancy attack. We draw ‘MICCAI’ on the same radiograph by attacking all
of the 19 landmarks to the targeted position with  = 8 and 3000 iterations, which
take 600s (per image) to compute on the GPU. As in Fig. 1, most landmarks
are hacked successfully, which justifies that the CNN-based landmark detection
is vulnerable to adversarial attacks.
5 Conclusion
We demonstrate vulnerability of CNN-based multiple landmark detection models
when facing the adversarial-example attack. We show that the attacker can arbi-
trarily manipulate landmark predictions by adding imperceptible perturbations
to the original image. Furthermore, we propose the adaptive targeted iterative
FGSM, a novel algorithm to launch the adversarial attack more efficiently and
effectively. At last, we investigate the relationship between vulnerability and
coupling of landmarks, which can be helpful in future defense.
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